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HYBRID REPRESENTATION AND STANDBY
COUNSEL: LET'S CLEAR THE AIR FOR THE
ATTORNEYS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

After eighteen years, three dead, twenty-three wounded, two hundred
suspects, and uncountable man hours, justice was served fifty miles north of
Helena, Montana on April 4,1996, when Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber,
was captured.' However, this was not the end of the road for the United States
judicial system. Over the next year and a half, a procedural nightmare unfolded
around Kaczynski. After his capture, Kaczynski fought an unending battle with
his defense counsel that climaxed the week of January 12, 1998, the week his
trial was set to begin.2 Kaczynski first attempted to dismiss his defense counsel
and hire new counsel because his attorneys wanted to characterize him as
mentally ill.' However, instead of hiring new counsel, Kaczynski surprised the
court and the country when he requested to represent himself (pro se
representation) for the remainder of his trial.4 While not all criminal cases
involving pro se defendants are so highly publicized, the issues surrounding pro
se representation illustrated by the Kaczynski case are common to the judicial
system.5
Because "most pro se defendant cases disrupt the criminal justice system,""
it seems absurd that the practice remains. Consider, for example, UnitedStates
v. Jennings.7 During the trial, the defendant assaulted his attorney with his fist,
had to be restrained by six marshals, and threatened to physically harm the
prosecutor, corrections officers, and former defense counsel.' The defendant

1. See Nancy Gibbs & David S. Jackson, In FitsandStarts,Kaczynski Throws the Unabom
Trial into Disarray.Is He a Master ManipulatororJustDesperately Confused?, TIME, Jan.19,
1998, at 26; David Johnston, Ex-Professor is Seized in Montana as Suspect in the Unabom
Attacks, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1996, at Al.
2. See Gibbs & Jackson, supra note 1, at 26-27.
3. Id. at 27.
4. Id. Judge Garland Bunell, Jr. denied Kaczynski's request. Id. However, the denial was
based on the lateness of the request. Id. If Kaczynski had made the request earlier he would have
been able to proceed pro se because a psychiatric examination determined that he was mentally
capable of representing himself. See id.
5. The rising number of pro se litigants has been a recent national trend. See Tom Sowa,
Risingto Their Own Defense: High LegalBillsJust One Reasonfor 'ProSe' Cases, SPOKEsMAN
REv., Mar. 29, 1999, at Al, availableat 1999 WL 6921087.
6. John F. Decker, The Sixth AmendmentRight to Shoot Oneselfin theFoot: An Assessment
of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 CONST. L.J. 485, 487
(1996).
7. 855 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
8. Id. at 1432-33.
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also threatened to cut the former defense counsel's throat and drink his blood.9
All of these threats resulted from the court's denial of the defendant's request
for substitute counsel prior to jury selection.' 0 Due to the outburst, the court
ruled that the defendant had waived his right to counsel, was competent to
represent himself, and allowed him to participate via his holding cell."
Despite these and otherproblems, pro se representation has enjoyed a long
history in this country which has culminated in the constitutional protection of
the right to pro se representation. 2 Still, pro se representation's long history of
creating difficulties has prompted courts across the country to devise creative
measures such as standby counsel and hybrid representation to handle these
problems. 3
Standby counsel is a role assumed by an attorney who agrees to assist a pro
se defendant with his defense and possibly to represent him if the defendant
loses or voluntarily relinquishes his pro se status.' 4 Hybrid representation arises
when a defendant represents himself pro se and is also represented by
counsel. 5 In hybrid representation the self-represented defendant and the
attorney act as co-counsel for the defense. 6
The purpose of this Comment is to identify the benefits and problems
associated with standby counsel and hybrid representation. In addition, this
Comment emphasizes the need to clarify this area of law and proposes a
potential solution that balances the interests ofpro se defendants, practitioners,
and judges. 7
Part II of this Comment examines the history, development, benefits, and
problems associated with pro se defendants. Part III compares standby counsel
and hybrid representation. Finally, Part IV outlines a proposed solution to the
problems associated with pro se representation utilizing the benefits of hybrid
representation and standby counsel.

9. Id. at 1433.
10. Id. at 1432.
11. Id. at 1433, 1445.
12. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
13. See Decker, supranote 6, at 535-38.
14. See infra Part HI.B.1.
15. See infra Part lII.A.1.
16. See infra Part III.A.1.
17. While acknowledging that pro se representation is utilized frequently in civil actions,
this Comment focuses only on the use of standby counsel and hybrid representation in criminal
matters.
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II. PRO SE REPRESENTATION
A. History
Pro se representation has its roots in the English judicial system." Under
English common law, a litigant accused of a crime was required to .'appear
before the court in his own person and conduct his own cause in his own
words.""' 9 Thus, the use of counsel was prohibited in criminal matters.20
Eventually the use of counsel was permitted,2 ' but the defendant's right 'to
make what statements he liked"' persisted.' This right was widely embraced
in the American colonies.' In fact, the right to self-representation was more
closely guarded in the American colonies than in England due to greater
notions of "self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers."24 The distrust
caused colonies such as Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut, and the
Carolinas to prohibit "[p]leading for hire" completely.' Eventually the colonies
acknowledged the value of counsel in criminal cases, but simultaneously, they
maintained their system of self-representation.2 6 The American emphasis on the
value ofcounsel and the desire to preserve self-representation culminated in the
statutory and constitutional right to both.27
B. ConstitutionalGuarantee
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
defendants in a federal criminal proceeding the right to assistance ofcounsel.2"
The incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the right to

18. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975).
19. Id. (quoting 1 F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed.
1909)).

20. See id.
21. Id. at 824.
22. Id. at 825 (quoting 5 W. HOLDsWORTH, A MSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 195 (1927)). The
right to represent oneself has existed throughout English legal history, with the exception of the
Star Chamber. Id. at 821. The Star Chamber was a judiciary arm created to try "political"
offenses. Id. The Star Chamber required all defendants to be represented by counsel because
otherwise, through tribunal procedure, the defendant would be deemed to have confessed. Id.at
821-22.
23. See id. at 826.
24. Faretta,422 U.S. at 826. This distrust stemmed from confrontations with the King's
Court, where the attorneys and the solicitors twisted the law to secure convictions. Id.
25. Id. at 827 n.32. The colonies allowed a party to be represented if she could not
represent herself provided no fee was paid. Id.
26. Id. at 827-28.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
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counsel to defendants in state criminal proceedings.29 Section 35 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, signed one day before the Sixth Amendment was
proposed, guaranteed the right to self-representation in the federal courts.30 In
addition, federal decisions," state constitutions,32 and state judicial decisions33
have recognized that the right to assistance of counsel includes the right to selfrepresentation during a criminal trial. However, self-representation was not an
absolute right. Self-representation was a privilege reserved to the discretion of
the trial judge until 1975 when the United States Supreme Court in Farettav.
California4 unequivocally recognized a defendant's constitutional right to
represent himself at trial.35 Farettadenied federal and state courts the power to
forbid a defendant from representing himself when the defendant "knowingly
and intelligently" relinquished the benefits ofrepresentationby counsel. 6 In the
wake of Faretta,the trial courts have been left with a myriad of problems
stemming from self-representation including a defendant's lack of substantive
knowledge, a defendant's lack of procedural and evidentiary expertise,
potential for disrupted courtrooms, 37 and an increased need for judicial
assistance in securing the rights of pro se defendants.38

29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42
(1963) (holding the right to counsel is fundamental to fairness and is enforceable against the
states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
31. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269,279 (1942) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a "correlative
right to dispense with a lawyer's help").
32. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 24; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10; COLO.
CONsT. art. II, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; Ky. CONsT. Bill of
Rights § 11; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; MASS. CONST. pt. 1,art. XII; MISS. CONST. art. III, §26; Mo.
CONST. art. , § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; NEv. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. XV; N.M. CONST. art. I, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 12; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20; OR. CONsT. art. I, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CoNST. ch. 1, art. X; WASH. CONST. art.
, § 22; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 7.
33. Lockard v. State, 451 P.2d 1014, 1023 (Idaho 1969); People v. Nelson, 268 N.E.2d 2,
5 (Ill. 1971); Blanton v. State, 98 N.E.2d 186, 187 (Ind. 1951); Zasada v. State, 89 A.2d 45,47
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952); People v. McLaughlin, 53 N.E.2d 356,357 (N.Y. 1944); State
v. Mems, 190 S.E.2d 164, 172 (N.C. 1972); State v. Verna, 498 P.2d 793, 796 (Or. Ct. App.
1972). But cf.Martinez v. Court ofAppeal ofCalif., Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152,160 (2000)
(holding neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause entitles defendant to represent
self on direct appeal from conviction).
34. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
35. See id. at 835-36.
36. Id. at 835. The court reasoned that to force a defendant "to accept against his will a
state-appointed public defender, the... courts deprived [the defendant] ofhis constitutional right
to conduct his own defense." Id. at 836.
37. See id. at 834 n.46.
38. See Decker, supranote 6, at 553.
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C. Problems
The first problem courts face due to self-representation is the defendant's
lack of substantive knowledge coupled with his inability to access legal
resources necessary to mount a complete defense. 9 Currently, ajudge need not
assist the pro se defendant who has encountered difficulty presenting his
defense.' While due process entitles a pro se defendant to a meaningful
opportunity to prepare his defense, the court need not satisfy a defendant's
every expectation."' Moreover, even if a defendant is potentially capable of
constructing a substantive defense, he may lack the resources to do so.42 The
Constitution does not guarantee a defendant unlimited access to law books,
private phones lines, witnesses, or investigators.43 Ifthere is a law library in the
prison, the defendant may have access to it, but such access is subject to the
normal prison procedures."
In addition to the pro se defendant's lack of substantive knowledge, his
procedural and evidentiary inexperience also poses problems for the court.4"
Pro se status is not an excuse for a defendant to neglect the court's procedural
rules.' The pro se defendant is subject to the same limitations as a defendant
represented by counsel, and the defendant's lack of knowledge and
inexperience place him at an extreme disadvantage.47 Specifically, the
defendant may forfeit valuable defenses or procedural rights because of his
innocent failure to follow the rules."
The third problem courts face by allowing a defendant to proceed pro se
is the potential for courtroom disruption.49 The Supreme Court has stated that
a trial court does not have to tolerate a disruptive pro se defendant.5 0
Furthermore, the Court has outlined constitutionally permissible ways that a
judge may respond to a disruptive pro se defendant.5' For example, the trial
judge may order the defendant to be bound and gagged, cite the defendant for
39. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (supporting the rule that a
defendant who chooses to proceed pro se may not complain of ineffective assistance of counsel).
40. See Decker, supra note 6, at 552.
41. See Milton v. Morris, 767 F.2d 1443, 1445-47 (9th Cir. 1985).
42. See People v. Heidelberg, 338 N.E.2d 56, 69-70 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that a
prisoner opting for pro se representation may neither have access to legal information nor the

right).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
46. See Decker, supra note 6, at 552.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Faretta,422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
50. Id. "The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom." Id.
51. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970). Also, the court has suggested that
a court may terminate a defendant's right to self-representation when the defendant engages in
disruptive behavior. Faretta,422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
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contempt, or order the defendant removed until he can conduct himself
appropriately. 2 However, the available remedies prevent a defendant from
continuing to defend himself pro se, which causes further delay and
disruption. 3
The final major problem associated with pro se representation is the
increased need for assistance from the bench.' The rules of evidence and trial
procedure are integral to the judicial process, and violations of those rules must
be prevented even in the absence of the pro se defendant's objection."5
Consequently, due to a pro se defendant's lack of evidentiary and procedural
knowledge, the judge must assume a protective role in order to prevent the
prosecutor from engaging in evidentiary or procedural misconduct; the judge
must guard against the exploitation ofa pro se defendant's lack of knowledge. 6
The duty to prevent violations places responsibility on a judge not only to run
the proceeding but also to be the personal guardian of the case, and ultimately,
of the pro se defendant.' Thus, a judge must let judicial economy and
neutrality suffer to guide a pro se defendant through the trial to ensure that
evidentiary and procedural rules are followed."8
As a remedy, many courts have chosen to use either standby counsel or
hybrid representation, or both, to respond to the problems associated with pro
se representation. 9 Part III discusses the arguments supporting and opposing
these remedies.

52. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44.
53. See id. at 344-46.
54. See Decker, supra note 6, at 553.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 553-54.
57. See id.
58. See People v. Hudson, 408 N.E.2d 325,329-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that it was
reversible error for the prosecutor to admit and the judge to allow the admission of improper
evidence, even absent a defendant's objection); Decker, supra note 6, at 555.
59. See Decker, supra note 6, at 535-38.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/5
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III. CURRENT JuDIcIAL REMEDIES

A. HybridRepresentation
I. Background
Hybrid representation has developed as a means of addressing the
problems associated with pro se defendants.' Hybrid representation allows a
defendant to direct the course of his defense and to participate in the trial while
retaining the ability to resort to the use of counsel when problems arise. 1
Essentially, hybrid representation creates a relationship of co-counsel between
the attorney and the pro se defendant.6 Thus, the attorney represents the
defendant in the proceeding, but the defendant also represents himself.63
Typically, this arrangement cannot be assumed or implied; to enter into the
arrangement, a defendant must make a request to the court." The ultimate
decision concerning whether to allow the arrangement is within the discretion
of the presiding judge. .
The roots of hybrid representation extend back to English common law,
beginning with the incompetency doctrine." Under the incompetency doctrine,
a criminal defendant was "incompetent to testify on his own behalf."'
However, the defendant "was permitted to make an unsworn statement to the
jury in order to argue his case."" Tus, even though he was represented by
counsel, a defendant could address the jury as if he were representing himself.
The incompetency doctrine was initially adopted in the United States.69
However, it was eventually abrogated in each state, beginning with Maine in
1864 and ending with Georgia in 1962.70

60. See J. Allison DeFoor II & Glenn H. Mitchell, HybridRepresentation: An Analysis of
a CriminalDefendant'sRight to Participateas Co-Counsel at Trial, 10 STETSON L. REv. 191,
191-93 (1981).
61. See Decker, supra note 6, at 537.
62. See id. at 540.
63. In contrast, standby counsel is not considered to represent the defendant in the
proceeding. See infra Part III.B.1.
64. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supranote 60, at 223. But see Anne Bowen Poulin, The Role
ofStandby Counsel in CriminalCases: In the Twilight Zone of the CriminalJustice System, 75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 676, 693-96 (2000) (discussing the possibility of the standby counsel
relationship drifting into a hybrid representation arrangement).
65. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 223.
66. See id. at 193 n.10.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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Out of the ashes ofthe incompetency doctrine came hybrid representation,
which appeared in the state courts and continues to exist today.7 The federal
courts gave little notice to the concept until the 1984 Supreme Court decision
of McKaskle v. Wiggins.7" In the time since the McKaskle decision, the
Supreme Court has not mentioned hybrid representation, but various federal
courts of appeals have frequently discussed it.73
Of the states that recognize hybrid representation, not all use it,74 but few
have specifically abrogated it.75 The clearinference is thathybrid representation
is still widely regarded by the federal and state courts as a valid solution to the
problems created by pro se representation.

71. SeeExparteArthur, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. 1997); Lonis v. State, 998 P.2d 441 (Alaska
2000); State v. Rickman, 715 P.2d 752 (Ariz. 1986); Monts v. Lessenberry, 806 S.W.2d 379
(Ark. 1991); People v. Clark, 833 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1992); People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo.
1989); State v. Gethers, 497 A.2d 408 (Conn. 1985); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189 (Del. 1980);
State v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1980); Cargill v. State, 340 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 1986); State v.
Hirano, 802 P.2d 482 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875 (I11.1997);
Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. 1999); State v. Martin, 740 P.2d 577 (Kan.1987); State
v. McCartney, 684 So. 2d 416 (La. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Dennany, 519 N.W.2d 128 (Mich.
1994); Brooks v. State, 763 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2000); State v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99 (Mo.
1999); State v. Wilson, 564 N.W.2d 241 (Neb. 1997); Wheby v. Warden, Nev. State Prison, 598
P.2d 1152 (Nev. 1979); State v. Cook, 750 A.2d 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); State v.
Boyer, 712 P.2d I (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Cabassa, 598 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1992); City of
Fargo v. Rockwell, 597 N.W.2d 406 (N.D. 1999); State v. Keenan, 689 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio 1998);
State v. Stevens, 806 P.2d 92 (Or. 1991); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999);
State v. Stuckey, 333 S.C. 56, 508 S.E.2d 564 (1998); State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn.
1999); Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Crannell, 750 A.2d
1002 (Vt. 2000); Spencerv. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989); State v. Hightower, 676
P.2d 1016 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); Statev. Layton, 432 S.E.2d 740 (W. Va. 1993); State v. Debra
A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1994). Presently, there is no reported case law from Idaho,
Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or South Dakota.
72. 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (recognizing the existence of a hybrid representation
arrangement but indicating that the decision to allow such an arrangement rests within the
discretion of the presiding judge).
73. See United States v. O'Neal, No. 97-50498, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 5242 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied,No. 97-50501, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 5638 (2000) (deciding whether it was an
abuse ofdiscretion to allow the defendant to proceed underhybrid representation); United States
v. Ogbonna, 184 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying defendant's right to submit a pro se
brief when represented by counsel); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34,47 (2d Cir. 1998)
(addressing pro se representation in connection with competency); United States v. Einfeldt, 138
F.3d 373,378 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation);
United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1095-97 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing waiver of right
to self-representation).
74. Some states recognize the doctrine, but there is no indication that it has ever been
allowed. See supranote 71.
75. Neither Maryland, Parren v. State,523 A.2d 597 (Md. 1987), nor North Carolina, State
v. Thomas, 484 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. 1997), recognizes hybrid representation. However, both states
accept the use of standby counsel. Parren,523 A.2d at 602 (stating "defendants were 'free to
accept or reject [the] advice' of counsel ... [but defendants] had only the right to selfrepresentation or to representation by counsel" (quoting Bright v. State, 509 A.2d 1227, 1231
(1986))); Thomas, 484 S.E.2d at 369 (indicating that use of standby counsel is protected by
statute).
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Of most interest to South Carolina practitioners, South Carolina courts
permit hybrid representation 6 as does the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.7 There is even a possible argument that hybrid
representation is guaranteed under the South Carolina Constitution because
Article I states that a defendant is entitled "to be fully heard in his defense by
himself or by his counsel or by both. 7' The language "or both" could

guarantee the right to hybrid representation. 79 However, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina has rejected this interpretation. 0 Instead, the current practice in
South Carolina is to follow the federal courts, which hold that hybrid
representation
is permissible but is granted only at the discretion of the trial
8
judge.
2. OpposingArguments
While there are arguments in favor of hybrid representation, a court
allowing a case to move forward under hybrid representation may be
confronted with major problems stemming from the relationship between the
attorney/co-counsel and the defendant/co-counsel.82
To understand the potential problems hybrid representation might present,
one must first fully understand the typical attorney-client relationship. The field
of law is considered to be a profession, and therefore an attorney is
characterized as a professional.83 The traditional notion is that the title of
professional comes with a self-proclaimed perception of expertise and a
position of complete autonomy over work-product." This perception has
traditionally lead to a professional-dominated, professional/client relationship
in which it is assumed both parties are best served when the professional

76. See State v. Stuckey, 333 S.C. 56, 57, 508 S.E.2d 564, 564 (1998); State v. Sanders,

269 S.C.215, 217, 237 S.E.2d 53, 54 (1977).
77. United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1100 (1997).

78. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 14. For other states that have similar language, see ALA. CONST.
art I, § 6; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 16; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1 para.9; ME. CONsT. art I, § 6; Miss.
CONST. art. I, § 26; and TEX. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10.
79. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 199-206.

80. Sanders, 269 S.C. at 217-18,237 S.E.2d at 54 (holding the "orboth" language does not
grant a constitutional right to hybrid representation).
81. DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 223-24.

82. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
83. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 8 (1974).
84. See id. Sociologist Howard Becker characterized a professional in the following way:
Professionals, in contrast to members of other occupations, claim and are
often accorded complete autonomy in their work. Since they are presumed
to be the only judges of how good their work is, no layman or other
outsider can make any judgment ofwhat they can do. If their activities are
unsuccessful, only another professional can say whether this was due to
incompetence or to the inevitable workings of nature or society by which
even the most competent practitioner would have been stymied.
Id. (quoting Howard Becker, The Nature ofa Profession, in EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS,
38-39 (1962)).
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"assum[es] broad control over solutions to the problems brought by the
client.385
The dominating professional has been the prevailing view of the
professional/client relationship since the time of Hippocrates,86 and continues
to be the prevailing view today. 7 This model of professional/client relationship
is termed the "Traditional Model." It makes the following assumptions:
Lawyers give adequate and effective service; [l]awyers are
able to be disinterested and make objective decisions; [t]he
solutions to legal problems are primarily technical;
[o]rdinarily, there is a correct solution to a legal problem; and
[lawyers are experts in the technical information that is
needed to arrive at the correct conclusion.88
The typical lawyer "take[s] charge of legal representation and... tell[s] clients
what they should do."8 9 The result is that the average attorney dominates the
relationship and takes "predominant control" over the case which is "delegated
to him rather passively by the client.""
Hybrid representation creates a foreign situation for the attorney because
ofthe co-counsel relationship between lawyer and defendant.9 The defendant
in this type of situation is not the typical defendant.' The defendant has chosen
to have a say in the direction of his defense. Like the pro se defendant, a
defendant who elects to enter into a hybrid representation arrangement wishes
to feel in control, to retain his dignity, and to establish his autonomy.9 3
However, unlike the pro se defendant, the defendant who chooses hybrid
representation recognizes that ifhe were to give up counsel, he would be giving
up knowledge and experience that he lacks.94 In light of this unconventional
relationship, the attorney in a hybrid representation arrangement cannot be the
typical attorney. However, in all likelihood, an attorney will not so easily
change, and a defendant who chooses to proceed under hybrid representation
is not impervious to the forcefulness of the typical attorney.95 This will likely
result in the defendant's taking second chair to the typical attorney's theory of
85. Id. at 7.

86. Id. "Hippocrates concerns himself with the difficulties posed for physicians in
manipulating patients made uncooperative by their illness." Id. at 7 n.2.
87. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 2 (1999). However, this is not the only
view. In addition to the traditional (authoritarian) model, there exists the client-centered model
and the collaborative model. See id. at 2-6.
88. Id. at 2 (citing ROSENTHAL, supranote 83, at 169).
89. Id. at 169.
90. ROSENTHAL, supranote 83, at 2.
91. See supratext accompanying notes 82-90.
92. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supranote 60.
93. See McKaskle v. Wiggens, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984).
94. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 221.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/5

10

Howard: Hybrid Representation and Standby Counsel: Let's Clear the Air fo

2001]

CRIMINAL LAW

defense and strategy direction. Herein lies the major problem with the doctrine
of hybrid representation: It poses a risk of clashing wills, putting both the
attorney and the client in an unfamiliar relationship.
Consider the following situation: A defendant is charged with the murder
of his ex-wife, and the defendant chooses knowingly and intelligently to
proceed pro se, but wishes his attorney to remain in the case as co-counsel.
During the early part of the trial, the prosecutors repeatedly fail in their
attempts to implicate the defendant. The defendant's co-counsel makes the
strategic decision to put a witness on the stand who could corroborate the
defendant's alibi. The defendant, who is guilty but has successfully hidden this
fact from his attorney, believes this to be a bad strategy because the witness is
lying for the defendant, and the defendant believes the prosecutor might bring
out the incriminating information. The defendant objects to the use of the
witness. The attorney proceeds over the objection. Direct examination goes
well, but the prosecutor destroys the defendant's case on cross-examination,
and the jury returns a guilty verdict in one hour, sending the defendant to jail
for two consecutive life sentences. If this were the typical attorney/client
relationship, no grounds would exist for overturning the conviction on account
of ineffective assistance of counsel, because the attorney acted reasonably
given the information available.97
However, hybrid representation creates its own unique ground for
ineffective assistance of counsel." If an attorney/co-counsel dominates a
defendant/co-counsel over the defendant's objections by not conceding to the
strategy decisions of the defendant, a guilty verdict could possibly be

96. An appeal for "ineffective assistance of counsel" is the logical outgrowth of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). There are three broad topics upon which a defendant may bring
a claim of ineffective assistance. First, a defendant may bring a claim based upon state
interference. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.8(c) (2d ed.
1992). Second, claims may be based upon attorney conflicts of interest. Id. at § 11.9(a). Finally,
a claim may be based upon lawyer incompetence. Id. at § 11.10. Lawyer incompetence is
characterized as an actual ineffectiveness claim, as opposed to the state interference claims. The
United States Supreme Court, in the decision ofStricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
created standards that must be established by the defendant to justify reversal of a conviction.
First, a defendant must show that "'counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as "counsel" guaranteed by... the Sixth Amendment' and "that the 'deficient
performance prejudiced the defense."' LAFAVE&ISRAEL, supra,at 11.10(a) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 668). Second, the standard by which a counselor will be judged is whether she
performed "'reasonably effective assistance,' as guided by 'prevailing professional norms' and
consideration of 'all the circumstances' relevant to counsel's performance." Id. (quoting
Strickland,466 U.S. at 668). Third, more specific guidelines are not appropriate. Id.Finally, "the
proper standard of prejudice is whether there is a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would be different."' Id. (summarizing the
holding of Strickland,466 U.S. at 687-88 (1984)).
97. Under the standard expressed in Strickland, the attorney most likely performed
"reasonably effective assistance." Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
98. Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272,280 (1977); see also DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note
60, at 223-26.
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overturned for ineffective assistance of counsel." Hybrid representation takes
the role of the traditional attorney out of the traditional attorney/client
relationship and forces the attorney into a relationship that runs counter to her
instincts. Therefore, either the lawyers must change, or the profession must
change.
3. SupportingArguments
There are several reasons hybrid representation should be used regularly
by state and federal courts."° First, the defendant has special knowledge of the
facts of the case or of a particular facet of the case.' Therefore, the hybrid
arrangement is better because the defendant/co-counsel will be better equipped
than his attorney/co-counsel to present those facts or that issue at trial, while
the attorney/co-counsel will be better equipped to handle other aspects of
procedural and substantive matters. 0" Second, there is a tactical consideration.
If a defendant chooses to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege and not take
the witness stand, the defendant may be dehumanized in the eyes of thejury.0 3
The jury will know the defendant merely by appearance and will be unable to
be swayed bypersonality and mannerisms. Alternatively, hybrid representation
allows the jury to witness the complete defendant.' Third, hybrid
representation may best suit the defendant's desires. A defendant may be aware
of what he loses when he chooses to proceed pro se, but he might prefer that
loss over the complete surrender of control."' Hybrid representation thus
allows the defendant to compromise. Finally, hybrid representation may
alleviate a defendant's mistrust of the legal system. Many defendants choose
to proceed pro se because they perceive their"attorney to be overburdened with
a heavy caseload, or not fully prepared," or they see a defense attorney,
particularly a public defender, as merely an extension of the prosecutor's
office.' 6 Thus, hybrid representation enables the defendant to have the advice
of counsel while still retaining a major role in the unfolding of his case.

99. See Landers, 550 S.W.2d at 280. Judge Douglas eloquently summarizes the major
problem with hybrid representation in the majority opinion:
[If hybrid representation were a mainstay of trial] one would have to pity
the plight of the defense counsel who would have to put up with an unruly
or untrained defendant. In case of a disagreement on a tactical matter, who
would control? If the lawyer prevailed in his view of strategy and a
defendant were to be convicted, many claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel would be raised. No doubt many civil suits against lawyers would
be filed if such a hybrid type of representation were required.
Id.
100. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 213-16, 220-22.
101. See id. at213.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 214.
104. See id.
105. Seeid. at216.
106. DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 220.
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The above reasons supporting hybrid representation are persuasive;
however, they are not compelling because the same goals can be achieved by
competent defense counsel or some other alternative, such as standby counsel.
As to the first reason, it may be true in some cases that a defendant would
harbor special knowledge about a case. However, the use of pro se
representation with standby counsel allows the pro se defendant to present the
facts while standby counsel is available to advise on procedural and evidentiary
matters and on substantive law."° It may also be true that hybrid representation
is beneficial to the defendant for tactical reasons. However, tactics by definition
are the implementation of a plan to achieve a particular goal.'08 It is not the job
of the court to aid a defendant in achieving his goals. Furthermore, if the
tactical reason for hybrid representation is for the jury to see the human side of
the defendant without cross-examination, this canbe accomplished through pro
se representation with standby counsel. As to the third reason, the defendant
may desire this arrangement of hybrid representation. However, it is not up to
the court to fulfill every desire of the defendant, especially one that has the
potential to create confusion."° The court outlines the framework of thejudicial
system, and the defendant then works within the framework. Finally, the fourth
reason may be valid because a defendant with a great mistrust for the legal
system would benefit from hybrid representation. However, a defendant's
mistrust for the legal system can be alleviated by allowing pro se representation
with standby counsel.
4. Future ofHybrid Representation
Overall, hybrid representation creates more serious problems than it solves.
As stated above, there are arguments in favor of the use of hybrid
representation that may all be true and deserving of serious consideration;" 0
however, these arguments are not compelling enough to warrant the continued
use of a form of representation which is not constitutionally protected, often
results in a combative relationship between the attorney and defendant,
needlessly subjects a hard-fought, guilty verdict to the possibility ofreversal for
ineffective assistance of counsel, and is unnecessarily employed given the
option of standby counsel. Therefore, in light of the unnecessary confusion and
problems associated with the use of hybrid representation, the Supreme Court
of South Carolina or the General Assembly should completely abrogate the use
of hybrid representation.

107. See infra Part III.B.1.
108. See WEBSTER'SNINTHNEwCOLLEGIATEDICIONARY 1201 (1987) for a definition of

tactical.

109. See supra Part III.A.2.
110. See supratext accompanying notes 78-81.
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The idea that hybrid representation should be completely abrogated has
support."' In 1997, Maryland's highest court firmly extinguished the potential
ofhybrid representation in Maryland with its decision inParrenv. State."2 The
court's analysis is simple but quite compelling. The Maryland court recognized
that there are only two types of representation which are constitutionally
guaranteed." 3 These are the right to "assistance of counsel" and to "selfrepresentation,"'"4 and these rights are mutually exclusive-the right to counsel
and the right to defend prose cannot be asserted simultaneously."' The court
stated by analogy: "There can be but one captain of the ship, and it is he alone
who must assume responsibility for its passage, whether it safely reaches the
destination charted or founders on a reef."' "6 The court recognized that hybrid
representation causes too much confusion, as opposed to the clear lines that are
established when the defendant chooses to be represented by counsel or to
represent himself."7
8
North Carolina also has an express prohibition of hybrid representation." 1
In North Carolina v. Thomas the court held that North Carolina only
recognizes representation by counsel and self-representation; it further held that
the judge erred when he allowed the defendant to proceed pro se while at the
same time appointing counsel to represent the defendant." 9
In South Carolina abrogating hybrid representation would not be difficult.
The potential constitutional hurdle to abrogation was crossed when the court
in State v. Sandersinterpreted the "or by both" language of the South Carolina
Constitution 2 as not granting a constitutional right to hybrid representation. 21
Therefore, hybrid representation could be abrogated without a constitutional
amendment. Either the South Carolina Supreme Court"a or the General
Assembly" could prohibit the arrangement. While hybrid representation was

S111.
See Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597 (Md. 1987); State v. Thomas, 484 S.E.2d 368 (N.C.

1997).
112. 523 A.2d at 602. The Court of Appeals viewed the relationship of the
defendant/standby counsel as a form of hybrid representation. Id. at 600-02.
113. Id. at 599.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. State v. Thomas, 484 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. 1997).
119. Id. at 370. Due to this "prohibition against hybrid representation, a court cannot allow
defendant to proceedpro se while also appointing counsel to represent him, even for a limited
purpose." Id.
120. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.
121. State v. Sanders, 269 S.C. 215,217,237 S.E.2d 53, 54 (1977).

122. S.C. CONST. art. V,§§ 4,4A. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has the power to
make rules regulating legal practice and procedure, subject to approval by the General Assembly
under §4A. Id. at §4A.
123. Stokes v. Denmark Emergency Med. Servs., 315 S.C. 263,266,433 S.E.2d 850,852
(1993) (holding that the power to regulate legal practice and procedure, while not spelled out in
the South Carolina Constitution, is not limited to the South Carolina Supreme Court-the
General Assembly can act independent of the court).
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permitted by the trial judge in Sanders,"4 a recent South Carolina Supreme
Court case addressed the subject ofhybrid representation and affirmed the trial
court's decision to deny the use of hybrid representation." Perhaps this is a
welcome signal that the court is not inclined to advocate the use of hybrid
representation, thereby making abrogation more likely.
Comparing the relatively modest benefits of hybrid representation to the
large potential problems it can cause, the courts of South Carolina and the
General Assembly of South Carolina should no longer recognize hybrid
representation as means to deal with the problems of pro se representation.
B. Standby Counsel
1. Background and Benefits
The use of standby counsel is the United States judicial system's other
response to the problems associated with pro se representation.12 Unlike hybrid
representation, standby counsel is not as complicated an arrangement. Standby
counsel can be designated by judicial appointment after a defendant validly
decides and is granted leave to proceed pro se. 127 Standby counsel does not
represent the pro se defendant. 28 Instead, standby counsel is used by the court
for two main reasons: (1) to provide advice to the defendant, such as advice on
the procedural and evidentiary rules of the court and assists the defendant in
developing his substantive case; 29 and (2) to ensure judicial efficiency by
carrying on with the trial in the event the pro se defendant cannot continue in
the defendant's representative capacity. 3 " In summary, standby counsel enables
the judge to perform the judge's role without having to constantly instruct the
pro se defendant on matters ordinarily thought of as mundane or obvious to the
experienced attorney because the standby counsel can assist the pro se
defendant.
While the benefits are relatively apparent, standby counsel is currently a
tool that is within the judge's discretion.' A trial judge is not required to
appoint standby counsel upon the request of the defendant. Moreover, ajudge
124. Sanders, 269 S.C. at 217, 237 S.E.2d at 54.
125. State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 43-45, 503 S.E.2d 747, 751-52 (1998).
126. See supra PartI.
127. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). A defendant must "'knowingly and
intelligently.' relinquish the "traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel." Id.

(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)). "Although a defendant need not
himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to competently and intelligently
choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-

representation ....

Id.

128. Faretta,422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (stating standby counsel may be available to represent

the accused in the event the accused can no longer represent herself).
129. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d
891, 894 (4th Cir. 1994).
130. Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274, 285 (Miss. 1997).
131. See McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir. 1985).
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can order standby counsel appointed against the defendant's wishes.'32
However, appointing standby counsel is a practice that is encouraged and
looked upon favorably.'33
The roots of standby counsel can be traced to a series of cases, but standby
counsel first gained significant national exposure as a possible solution to the
problems ofpro se representation in Farettav. California.134 In Farettathe trial
court ruled that the defendant, who had previously represented himself, was not
capable of waiving his rights knowingly and intelligently and that he had no
constitutional right to pro se representation. 35 The Supreme Court reversed the
trial court and recognized that while all courts agree that a constitutional right
to assistance of counsel exists under the Sixth Amendment, not all courts agree
that, conversely, this includes the constitutional right to refuse counsel. 136 In the
opinion, the Court noted it was well aware ofthe problems associated with 1self37
representation, but sufficient remedies existed, such as standby counsel.
In South Carolina, the use of standby counsel was first proposed in State
v. Sanders, a post-Farettacase.138 The defendant Sanders was given the choice
to proceed as co-counsel with his attorney or pro se with standby counsel.'
Sanders initially chose to proceed as co-counsel but later requested to change
to pro se representation with standby counsel. 40 The court allowed the use of
standby counsel, and Sanders continued with his defense.' Today, South
Carolina judges appoint standby counsel at their discretion. Thus, standby
counsel is currently not a pro se defendant's absolute privilege.'
2. Problemswith the CurrentSystem of Standby Counsel
While standby counsel is a beneficial option for pro se defendants, it has
two significant problems in its current form. First, some believe there is great
ambiguity surrounding the role of standby counsel.'43 Second, in states
permitting hybrid representation, the current perception of standby counsel
leaves open the possibility of an implied hybrid representation arrangement,

132. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
133. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 467-68 (1971) (Burger, CJ.,
concurring).
134. 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975).

135. Id. at 809-11.
136. Id. at 814. "[T]he Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel implicitly
embodies a 'correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help."' Id. (quoting Adams v. United
States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
137. Id. at 834-35 n.46.
138. 269 S.C. 215, 237 S.E.2d 53 (1977).

139. Id. at 217, 237 S.E.2d at 54.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 43-44, 503 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1998).

143. See, e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (illustrating the blurry lines
between representation and non-representation).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/5
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which would ultimately subject the attorney/defendant relationship to the
problems discussed under hybrid representation.'"
a. Ambiguity
As to the ambiguity that surrounds standby counsel, consider the
following: A defendant accused of robbery elects to represent himselfpro se.
The court chooses to permit the pro se representation but appoints standby
counsel over the defendant's initial objections. The defendant, in an attempt to
define the standby counsel role, firmly requests that the standby counsel not be
allowed to assist or interrupt. However, when the defendant later examines
witnesses, the defendant interrupts his examination many times to consult with
his standby counsel and allows the standby counsel to assume some courtroom
duties. The defendant is subsequently convicted and then complains about the
intrusion of standby counsel in the presence of the jury and in the presence of
the judge without the jury. The defendant particularly complains that standby
counsel expressed her view to the judge and made unsolicited remarks in front
of the jury. This scenario is a simplistic version of the facts of McKaskle v.
Wiggins. 4 ' In McKaskle the Supreme Court dealt with whether the intrusion of
standby counsel violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to counsel
under Faretta." If the Court had concluded that those rights were violated by
the intrusion of standby counsel, then the Court would have had to reverse the
conviction and order a new trial. 47 This reversal would be the result of an illdefined role of standby counsel.
This analysis is significantly different from the Sixth Amendment analysis
under hybrid representation.'" While hybrid representation and standby
counsel both subject a conviction to the possibility of reversal under the Sixth
Amendment, the theories behind the possible Sixth Amendment violations are
quite different. As discussed earlier, under hybrid representation an attorney

144. Poulin, supranote 64, at 693-96; see also Part IlI.A.2.
145. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
146. Id. at 178-79. The court in McKaskle stated:
The defendant's appearance in the status of one conducting his own
defense is important in a criminal trial, since the right to appear pro se
exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy. In related
contexts the courts have recognized that a defendant has a right to be
present at all important stages of trial, that he may not normally be forced
to appear in court in shackles or prison garb, and that he has a right to
present testimony in his own behalf. Appearing before the jury in the status
of one who is defending himself may be equally important to the pro se
defendant.
Id. (citations omitted).
147. United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 364 (1998) (stating "a valid claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel... justiflies] ... reversal of... conviction" if the prongs of
Strickland are met).
148. See supraPart III.A.1.
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still represents the defendant.'4 9 Therefore, the question is whether the attorney
rendered effective assistance ofcounsel. 0 With standby counsel, the defendant
represents himself alone, effectively waiving his right to complain of
"ineffective assistance ofcounsel,'' while the attorney sits in a position to aid
the defendant when needed. Therefore, when standby counsel assumes too
much control, the Sixth Amendment analysis is whether the defendant was
afforded his Sixth Amendment right to "assistance of counsel."
The Court inMcKaskle ultimately decided against the defendant, reversing
the Fifth Circuit; the majority stated that it did not see a need to go so far as to
patently disallow standby counsel a participatory role in trial.'52 However, the
Court left the door wide open for appeals and excessive litigation in this area
by leaving the role of standby counsel so unclear and by making Sixth
Amendment analysis of standby counsel conduct a subjective standard.'53 In the
sixteen years sinceMcKaskle was decided, the Supreme Court has not clarified
the appropriate role of standby counsel.
In South Carolina the doctrine of standby counsel has not been clearly
defined.'"5 The Supreme Court of South Carolina confronted the doctrine for
the first time in State v. Sanders.' In the twenty-three years since Sanders,the
South Carolina courts have confronted the doctrine of standby counsel in
relatively few cases.' Therefore, the case ofState v. Reed is highly important
to this area of law.'58 Reed discussed whether the defendant had the right to
have standby counsel appointed after the guilt phase of the trial but during the
sentencing phase.' 59 The court held that this right did not exist because the
request was untimely."6

149. See supraPart III.A.I.
150. See supraPart IIl.A.I.
151. See McKaslde, 465 U.S. at 177 n.8 (stating a pro se defendant waives his right to
complain of ineffective assistance of counsel).
152. Id. at 188 ("[Clounsel need notbe excluded altogether."); id.at 182 ("[A] categorical
bar on participation by standby counsel ... is unnecessary.").
153. Id. at 181 ("[E]xcessive involvementby counsel will destroy the appearance that the
defendant is acting pro se.").
154. This case has been followed numerous times in the last sixteen years. Bribiesca v.
Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2000); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470,475 (8thCir.
1998); Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 749
(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1901); United
States v. Heine, 920 F.2d 552,554 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897,902 (2d
Cir. 1990); United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 441-42 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.
Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298-99 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Walsh, 742 F.2d 1006, 1007
(6th Cir. 1984).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 161-64.
156. 269 S.C. 215, 237 S.E.2d 53 (1977).
157. State v. Campen, 321 S.C. 505,469 S.E.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Reed, 332
S.C. 35, 503 S.E.2d 747 (1998).
158. Reed, 332 S.C. at 35, 503 S.E.2d at 747.
159. Id. at44, 503 S.E.2d at 751.
160. Id.
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Reed is particularly significant because the South Carolina Supreme Court
defined standby counsel for the first time. 6 The court defined standby counsel
as an aid to the defendant to the extent desired. 62 Because this definition is so
vague and ambiguous, the attorneys who are thrust into the role of standby
counsel are left with very little guidance. While ambiguity is not always
harmful, ambiguity in the role of standby counsel can be particularly
harmful'" When neither the standby counsel nor the defendant can clearly
define the role of standby counsel, each may hold different assumptions, and
this may be a source of contention. The contention may be so serious that the
judge is forced to become involved. In short, the ambiguity could cause
unnecessary expenditures of time and energy. It could also lead a defendant to
feel shortchanged, or, alternatively, to believe that standby counsel is forcibly
interfering with his case.
b. Implied Hybrid Representation
The second problem surrounding the current view ofstandby counsel is the
possibility that a hybrid representation arrangement will be implied into the
standby counsel/pro se defendant relationship. 65 The prevailing view is that in
order to create a hybrid representation arrangement, the defendant must request
permission from the judge.'" This is because a request of hybrid representation
is equal to a request of partial pro se representation, and in order for a
defendant to be able to represent himselfpro se, he must be granted permission
by a judge. A judge must deny prose representation if the defendant is deemed
incompetent.' 67 In addition, ifa defendant who is currently representing himself
pro se wishes to relinquish that right, courts will grant his request if the
proceeding will not be disrupted. 68 This is a very low standard, much lower
than the standard for receiving permission to proceed pro se. The relative ease
with which a party may surrender
self-representation is what opens the door to
69
implied hybrid representation.
Implied hybrid representation involves a defendant's moving from full pro
se representation (with the attorney acting as standby counsel) to partial pro se
representation (with the attorney acting as co-counsel with the defendant). This
situation can occur when an overzealous standby counsel intervenes in a pro se
defendant's case either with or without permission. In actuality, when standby

161. See id. at 43-44, 503 S.E.2d at 751.
162. See id.The court "allowed counsel to sit beside appellant as standby counsel and aid
appellant to the extent he desired." Id. at 43, 503 S.E.2d at 751.
163. See id.We must assume standby counsels may participate no further than the limits
of McKaskle. However, what limits does McKaskle set out?
164. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
165. Poulin, supra note 64, at 693-96.
166. See DeFoor & Mitchell, supra note 60, at 223.
167. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
168. See Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1989).
169. See Poulin, supra note 64, at 693-96.
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counsel intervenes, she is either taking, or the defendant is voluntarily
relinquishing, the defendant's right to pro se representation; therefore, the
defendant does not necessarily need the permission of the court for implied
hybrid representation.170 Thus, it appears that a defendant and standby counsel
can inadvertently slip into an implied hybrid representation arrangement which
exposes the pioceeding to all of the problems associated with hybrid
representation. In practice, a defendant's conviction would be subject not only
to a challenge onFarettagrounds, but also to a challenge on Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. On appeal, the defendant could argue
that a standby counsel/pro se defendant arrangement existed and that the
standby counsel was overzealous in her assistance, or the defendant could
argue that the overzealous actions of the standby counsel created an implied
hybrid representation, and therefore, the standby counsel was in reality a cocounsel and owed all duties of a co-counsel, including effective representation.
Thus, the potential for implied hybrid representation creates additional
considerations for the court when permitting the pro se defendant to retain
standby counsel.
3. Standby Counsel v. HybridRepresentation
Despite its problems, standby counsel as an arrangement between an
attorney and a pro se defendant is superior to hybrid representation for several
reasons. First, the form of standby counsel representation is restricted to what
is constitutionally permitted-representation by counsel or pro se
representation.' 7' Second, the interpersonal dynamics ofthe relationship are not
confused by the attorney and client having to collaborate as co-counsel.'72
Third, the judge can better protect the verdict when the arrangement is standby
counsel. While both arrangements subject a verdict to possible reversal under
the Sixth Amendment, the trial judge has a greater possibility of preventing a
Sixth Amendment challenge under the standby counsel arrangement because
the judge can proactively restrain standby counsel from becoming the
overzealous assistant complained of by pro se defendants on appeal. However,
under the hybrid representation arrangement, the judge can do little to prevent
the attorney from endangering the verdict because the problems the pro se
defendant complains of on appeal are interpersonal and are not readily apparent
to the court during trial. Finally, as stated earlier, standby counsel can provide
the pro se defendant with all of the benefits hybrid representation is thought to
provide, including: (1) allowing the defendant with special knowledge to

170. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182-83 (recognizing the trial court allowed hybrid
representation without the defendant requesting permission from the judge); see also Poulin,
supra note 64, at 693-96 (supporting the idea that a pro se defendant/standby counsel
relationship can "drift" to hybrid representation).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81 (discussing the ambiguity in the South
Carolina Constitution regarding the constitutionality of hybrid representation).
172. See supraPart III.B.1.
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present the case, but also providing legal expertise when the defendant lacks
substantive and procedural legal knowledge; (2) allowing the defendant to be
seen and heard without having to take the stand; and (3) accounting for a
defendant's mistrust of the legal system by allowing the defendant to represent
himself. 3
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Despite its problems, standby counsel serves the courts in substantially
beneficial ways and should be used often, though standby counsel should
continue to be used only at the trial judge's discretion. Unlike hybrid
representation, the problems associated with standby counsel are easily
remedied. To address the problem of ambiguity, guidelines should be created
to define the role of standby counsel for both the attorney serving in the role
and the pro se defendant receiving the benefits. For the potential problem of
implied hybrid representation, the abrogation of hybrid representation should
prevent the actions of an overzealous standby counsel from causing the
relationship with the pro se defendant to be re-characterized as hybrid
representation. Thus, abrogation of hybrid representation can eliminate the
problems that implied hybrid representation poses. If abrogation is not the
desired path, then the creation of clear guidelines for standby counsel should
lessen the possibility ofimplied hybrid representation. If standby counsel stays
within her defined role, then her role should remain as standby counsel and not
drift into the realm of hybrid representation.
Questions arise as to what type of guidelines the South Carolina Supreme
Court or the General Assembly should create to regulate standby counsel.
Essentially, the nature of the guidelines depends on what the proper role of
standby counsel should be. There are two major judicial schools of thought.'74
These opposing views are manifested in the majority and the dissenting
opinions of McKaskle v. Wiggins.'
The first position is Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, which advocates
allowing standby counsel a certain amount of responsibility, provided it is with
the pro se defendant's permission or does not offend the pro se defendant's
rights under Faretta.176 Justice O'Connor's position allows the defendant
latitude in his defense and standby counsel latitude in her assistance by
allowing standby counsel to substantially participate in the trial with permission
and to participate minimally when comments are infrequent or innocuous.'"

173. See supraPart II.A.3.
174. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
175. Id.
176. See id.at 181-88. The Court is concerned about the standby counsel's participation
in front of thejury. The court notes that, practically speaking, a pro se defendant's Farettarights
cannot be undermined outside of the jury's presence unless the participation is entirely
overbearing. See id. at 181-82.
at 185-87.
177. Id.
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Upon review, the court isolates each intrusion by standby counsel and judges
the intrusion against the pro se defendant's Faretta rights.' 78 Justice
O'Connor's standard serves to set very permissive upper limits on standby
counsel's involvement in a criminal proceeding.'7
The second judicial position appears in Justice White's dissenting
opinion.'80 The opinion advocates that standby counsel's involvement should
be only to be "seen-but-not-heard,"'' 8' but the occasional innocuous comment
from standby counsel should be permitted.18 2 Justice White supports the notion
that standby counsel's involvement cannot be judged in compartmentalized
groupings.' a A court must view the trial as a whole because that is the way a
pro se defendant assesses standby counsel's involvement, and the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights are the ones being violated by the intrusions of
standby counsel.' 4 This standard, if followed, would make it much more
difficult to overturn a conviction and, at the same time, would allow the pro se
defendant the freedom he desires.
Currently it appears that South Carolina advocates standby counsel
involvement up to the limits of McKaskle.8 5 However, this implies little
because McKaskle says little; therefore, abuse of the role of standby counsel is
possible. The South Carolina Supreme Court or the General Assembly needs
to speak on the issue because eventually an appointed standby counsel will
either over-assist the defendant and cause a potential reversal of the conviction
or will under-assist the pro se defendant and deprive him of the assistance to
which he is entitled.
Therefore, to address the pro se issue proactively, this Comment proposes
several changes to the current system. First, the name "standby counsel" should
be changed to "advisory counsel." A pro se defendant must understand that the
decision he has made is important and must not be taken lightly. The words
"standby counsel" paint the picture of the backup quarterback waiting on the
sideline for the starting quarterback to get hurt so that he can get his chance.
The pro se defendant must not think that as soon as his self-representation gets
out of hand he can just say, "I quit," and then send in a backup, because while

178. Id. at 197 (White, J., dissenting).
179. There is a commentator who advocates this permissive role. Ann Bowen Poulin, a
Villanova University law professor, advocates that the role of standby counsel "should be
strengthened" and "[c]ourts should... expand the role." Poulin, supranote 64, at 678. Standby
counsel should "be an active and supportive force in the pro se defendant's trial." Id. Poulin
states that she advocates standby counsel to the limits permitted by McKaskle, but she seems to
advocate an extension of standby counsel beyond the role contemplated by Justice O'Connor in
the McKaskle opinion. See id. at 706.
180. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 188-99 (White, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 190-92.
182. Id. at 192.
183. Id. at 197.
184. See id.
185. State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 43, 503 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1998) (stating standby counsel
is "to sit beside appellant as standby counsel and aid appellant to the extent [the appellant]
desire[s]").
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the courts readily permit apro se defendant to surrender self-representation, the
courts do not advocate an immediate grant of counsel. 86
Second, South Carolina should generally adopt Justice White's dissent.
The advisory counsel should be "seen-and-not-heard" in almost every instance.
Her role should be to assist the pro se defendant in substantive preparation by
gathering the necessary materials needed to construct a capable defense. She
should assist the pro se defendant procedurally by issuing subpoenas, filing
motions, and addressing general procedural issues relevant to the pro se
defendant's case. She should advise the defendant on all evidentiary matters
including objecting at trial. In general, advisory counsel should be a coach,
meaning she should explain courtroom protocol and instruct the pro se
defendant on the proper way to handle himself in front of the jury and the
judge. If the pro se defendant objects to all of the above assistance, then
advisory counsel may do as little as needed to ensure judicial economy and an
orderly courtroom. Advisory counsel should not address the court or the jury
except in the following circumstances: (1) she may object directly to
evidentiary orprocedural matters on behalf of the pro se defendant, (2) she may
be required to cross-examine the victim1 7 so that the victim will not have to
face the accused directly, and (3) she may be required to directly examine the
pro se defendant. Finally, the jury should be informed of this arrangement prior
to trial so they are not confused by the advisory counsel's role.
V. CONCLUSION

Throughout United States legal history, pro se representation has been an
integral part of the justice system. This history and general acceptance of the
doctrine culminated in the declaration of a constitutional right. This declaration
ensured that pro se representation, however good or bad, is and will continue
to be a mainstay of the criminal justice system.
Pro se representation has historically created many problems for the courts,
including: (1) the pro se defendant's lack of substantive legal knowledge to
construct a defense; (2) the pro se defendant's inability to protect himself
adequately from the prosecution because of his lack of knowledge about
procedural and evidentiary law; (3)the potential for courtroom disruption; and
(4) an increased need for judges to choose between enforcing the rules of
evidence and procedure while maintaining impartiality.
In theory, hybrid representation is an attractive solution. However, in
practice it creates many problems for the court, the attorney, and the defendant.
It creates a relationship that often results in combativeness between attorney
and defendant, needlessly introduces another means by which a guilty verdict

186. Id. at 44, 503 S.E.2d at 75 1. There is a strong presumption that a defendant should be
able to waive his right to self-representation. However, this decision is within the discretion of
the court, and if a waiver would poorly serve the justice system or cause delay then it will often
not be permitted. Id.
187. The term "victim" refers only to the person directly injured by the crime, not a relative
or friend who has been indirectly affected.
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may be overturned, and is ambiguous in light of the alternative solution
presented by standby counsel. Therefore, the use of hybrid representation
should be foreclosed.
Standby counsel is also an attractive solution in theory, but, as currently
practiced, it has caused many problems for the courts. However, unlike hybrid
representation, these problems can be remedied and are subject to greater
judicial control because they are based on ambiguities in the role of standby
counsel. Clarification of the role would better serve the attorneys thrust into the
role and the defendants who are hoping to benefit from the presence of standby
counsel.
With action from either the judiciary or the legislature, South Carolina
should clean up and clarify this area of law. Such clarification would be useful
for the judges of this state who, unfortunately, must deal with the problems a
pro se defendant introduces to the court.
Joshua L. Howard
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